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ISRAELI POLICIES TOWARDS IMPORTS OF MANUFACTURED GOODS*
In this paper the policy of the Israeli government towards imports of
manufactured goods is examined. This policy has passed throuth two
distinct phases. In the 1950s quantitative restrictions on imports were
enforced to stimulate domestic production of import substitutes. In the
1960s the deleterious effects of protectionist policies on resource allo-
cation were recognized and the emphasis was changed in favour of im-
port liberalization, i. e. the replacement of quantitative restrictions by
tariffs and the eventual reduction of the tariffs. In recognition of the
discontinuity of import policy the paper is divided into two parts reflec-
ting the two phases.
The frame of reference of the paper is determined by the wider re-
search project of which it is part, i. e. import policy is examined as a
means of influencing the rate of growth and the nature of the industrial
sector during the process of economic development. Israel is of special
interest in this context because of its extremely rapid economic develop-
ment, both generally and in the industrial sector, and is arguably the
only country to have changed its status from an LDC to a developed
country in the postwar era. Study of the role of trade policy in this rapid
development may provide useful lessons for other LDCs. Israel has of
course had certain advantages over other LDCs (especially her large
capital inflow and initial endowment of human capital), but her problem
of reducing the trade deficit opened up by the pressures of economic
development is simular to that of most other LDCs. Furthermore, her
initial response in terms of encouraging import substitution by protecting
domestic producers is one which appealed to many LDCs in the past, and
thus the consequences of this policy and the problems of later reducing
the level of protection are issues of wide applicability.
This paper reports research undertaken in the "Sonderforschungsbereich
Nr. 86, Weltwirtschaft und international Wirtschaftsbeziehungen
(Kiel/Hamburg)", with financial support provided by the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft. I am grateful to Dr. J. B. Donges for
helpful comments on an earlier draft.- 2 -
As a preliminary to the paper some comment on the choice of terminal
dates is appropriate. The starting date is intended to reflect the beginning
of the economic existence of Israel as an independent state. 1950 was
selected, rather than 1948 when the state was officially founded, for
three reasons: (i) there exist no data for 1948-9 on economic magni-
tudes such as GNP, (ii) 1948-9 were war years with great disruption of
economic activity, (iii) by the end of 1949 practically all abandoned
Arab property which was to be reused had been brought into economic
production. Thus, only after 1950 can the behaviour of the Israeli
economy be taken as indicative of its normal functioning (Patinkin, p. 18).
The closing date of the first part of the paper marks the adoption in
February 1962 of the New Economic Policy, which was intended to ex-
pose domestic producers (gradually) to foreign competition. In order to
assist orientation of readers unfamiliar with the Israeli economy some
indicators for the years 1950, 1962 and 1972 are given in Table I.
1. Industrialization By Import Substitution 1950-62
The aim of this part of the paper is to make an assessment of the
Israeli government' s policy between 1950 and 1962 of encouraging in-
dustrial development by means of import substitution. The first section
deals with the reasons why such a policy was adopted and also serves as
an introduction to some of the issues concerning import substitution
policies. In section II we turn to the questions of how the policy was im-
plemented and how strongly the goal was pursued, i. e. what was the
extent of the protection offered to domestic producers. In section III
various measures of the success of the policy, i.e. the amount of
import substitution that took place and its contribution to Israel' s
economic growth in the period, are given. Section IV deals with the
costs of the policy in terms of misallocation of resources. Finally, the
results are brought together and some conclusions drawn from them in
section V.- 3 -
Table I
Selected Economic Indicators; Israel 1950 and 1962
Population
Area (square miles)
GNP at market prices
(I £ millions current prices)
GNP at market prices
(I £ millions 1964 prices)
Imports ($ thousand)
Exports ($ thousand)
Import deficit ($ thousand)
Consumer Price Index (1959 = 100)
Exchange rate (I £ per $)
Notes: after devaluation of February
territories; -
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Source: Central Bureau of Statistics: Statistical Abstract of Israel,
various years.- 4 -
In adopting a policy of encouraging import substitution in the 1950s
Israel was similar to many other LDCs. The reasons for this general trend
have been dealt with many times (e. g., Little, Scitovsky & Scott) and there
is little point in going into detail here. Essentially the arguments were
twofold, one negative and one positive. First, there was the disaffection
with export-led growth following the disruption of world markets during the
depression of the 1930s and the 1939-45 world war. Second, there was the
desire for greater independence which it was hoped that autarchic economic
development would bring.
For Israel these arguments were reinforced by her status as a new
country. The mass immigration between 1948 and 1951, which more than
doubled the Jewish population, had increased demand faster than domestic
supply and thus almost all goods were to some extent imported. Government
policy to reduce the trade deficit was at first concentrated on reducing food
imports, but in such a situation almost any domestic production (apart from
the two major exports, diamonds and citrus) was bound to be import substi-
tuting. Thus in the early 1950s some of Israel' s economic development was
going to be import substituting whether the government planned it or not,
and we would expect Chenery-type measures of the contribution of import
substitution to economic growth to be high in these early years (cf. section III).
Israeli government policy in the 1950s was, however, much more than a
laissez faire policy which happened to result in import substitutioa The
extent of protection offered to import substitutors was great and remained
so throughout the 1950-62 period, i. e., until long after the initial effect
discussed in the previous paragraph had exhausted itself. The positive
espousal of an import substitution policy no doubt reflected the conventional
wisdom of the time , and this was emphasised by Israel' s own military and
Disruption of world trade between 1939 and 1945 had not only turned the
Palestinian Jews against an export expansion policy (because of disastrous
effects on citrus exports), but had also turned them in favour of protective
barriers because the period had been a prosperous one. The 193S-45
prosperity had, however, rested on the preeminent position of Palestinian
manufacturing industry (which was mainly Jewish owned) in supplying
military and regional demands in the Middle East as a whole, rather than
on production for domestic demand.- 5 -
political situation. The geopolitical situation in the Middle East made a
policy aimed at economic self-sufficiency particularly attractive. Also the
desire to construct a modern economy led to detailed government intervention
in the economy, - an intervention better suited to preventing imports than to
encouraging exports.
The old controversy of import substitution versus export promotion has
now been raised and may be dealt with at this point. For a country which has
a trade deficit there are two ways of removing the deficit; either increase
exports or reduce imports. Of course both can occur simultaneously and
some policies may serve both goals (e. g., an undervalued currency if demand
curves are elastic). The problem is, however, often posed as one of en-
couraging specific industries, of which some produce import substitutes (e. g.,
machinery in Israel) and others produce exports (e.g., citrus). Thus the
dichotomy can be raised of whether to encourage import substituting or export
industries. Even stated in these terms there is not necessarily a contra-
diction; it all depends upon the shape of the demand and supply functions. If
demand is elastic, transport costs small and there are constant returns to
scale, then the most efficient import substituting industry will also be the
most efficient exporter, and there will be a unique ranking of which industries
should be encouraged irrespective of the government' s predilection for import
substitution or export promotion. The restictions necessary for this con-
clusion are, however, rather rigid. For example, failure to expand very
rapidly the two industries where Israel had a clear comparative advantage
may be explained by a belief that Israel' s exports of citrus and diamonds
2
faced a downward-sloping demand curve . The assumption of constant returns
to scale is also a rather dubious generalization, especially when applied to
the medium and long-term. Nevertheless the technique of using the domestic
resource cost of a dollar saved or a dollar earned can still be used to
2
Citrus and diamonds accounted for 91 % of Israel' s gross export proceeds
in 1949 (Rubner pp. 19-20).- 6 -
determine which industries are most efficient at the margin, and, depen-
ding, for example, on whether the industry is still on a downward-sloping
section of its cost curve, it provides a guide as to which industries should
be encouraged. Thus, with a certain degree of sophistication among
government economists, the rule of thumb for resource allocation which
depends on a dichotomy between import substitution and export promotion
is no longer useful. The question which will be raised in section IV is to
what extent reliance on such a rule of thumb was harmful to resource
allocation in Israel.
The arguments of this section can now be restated. Because of Israel' s
peculiar situation as an almost new economy some of the increase in
domestic production in the early 1950s was necessarily import substituting.
Conceptually this should be separated from the import substituting pro-
duction which resulted from the government policies in this direction. The
extent to which government policies followed the rule of thumb of encourag-
ing industries producing import substitutes is examined in the next section,
where it will be seen that such a rule was almost invariably utilized. Re-
liance on such a rule will in general not lead to optimal resource allocation
and the extent of the misallocation is analyzed in section IV.
II
During the period 1950-62 the Israeli pound was devalued by 769 %.
After the declaration of Israel' s independence in 1948 the Israeli pound
was retained at a par with sterling and followed the sterling devaluation of
September 1949 to a rate of £ 0. 357 per U. S. dollar. The high rate of in-
flation and heavy demand for imports 1949-52 soon rendered this rate un-
realistic and in 1952 two other rates were adopted for trade purposes,
although 0.357 remained the official rate. The official rate was set at
I£l/$ in December 1953, only to be abolished in August 1954 when a single
formal rate of I£l. 8/$ replaced the three existing rates . This was de-
3
Except for transactions by institutions which were carried out at I£l. 3/$
August 1954-Ocotober 1955 and at I£1.5/$ October 1955-April 1958.- 7 -
clared the official rate of exchange in July 1955 and remained so until the
devaluation of February 1962 when a rate of I£3/$ was adopted.
The devaluation of the Israeli pound was an adjustment process in the
face of its continued overvaluation, i. e. the demand for foreign currency
exceeded supply at the going exchange rate. An overvalued currency en-
courages imports and the government used two policy tools to restrict the
level of imports: tariffs and physical restrictions. It has generally been
considered that the latter were the more important. The only empirical
study, however, is Gafni, Halevi and Hanoch' s attempt to categorize the
tariffs of 1955/6. They distinguish between (a) "revenue" tariffs, which
do not reduce the amount imported because domestic demand is inelastic
in the relevant range (usually because a quota is the binding constraint on
the increased imports, rather than the price), (b) "import-diminishing"
tariffs, which reduce imports, but do not increase domestic supply,
(c) "protective" tariffs, which reduce imports and increase domestic pro-
duction. Of their sample, 42. 9 % of total imports had a revenue duty (of
which 24. 2 % were goods produced in Israel and 18. 7 % not produced in
Israel), 49. 9 % an import-diminishing duty and 7. 2 % a protective duty.
Thus, on the majority of imported commodities tariffs were more signi-
4
ficant than quotas in reducing imports . In terms of protection for domestic
industries, however, the opposite is the case with over three quarters of
the burden being born by quotas. Thus Halevi concludes elsewhere that:
"Protective customs duties were levied more as insurance
against imports which, could slip by than as a basic means
of protection. " (Halevi and Klinov-Malul, p. 238).
Implementation of the administrative restrictions involved a two-stage
process. A potential importer had first to obtain a licence for the specific
import and then he had to negotiate the exchange rate at which he would ob-
tain the required foreign currency from the government. In the early 1950s
the rules of thumb for issuing licences were fairly rigid. Luxury imports
4
Insofar as any conclusions can be made from data based on actual import
figures, e. g. the smaller proportion of imports which were restricted
by quotas may reflect the efficiency of quotas in reducing imports!- 8 -
were discouraged and licences were only granted for essentials. Exceptions
were made in the case of importers who did not require foreign exchange;
this was especially prevalent up to 1952 and was a major loophole for black
market transcations (i. e. luxury imports entered Israel but at very high
effective exchange rates). Licences were not allowed if a domestic producer
(or even a potential domestic producer) existed. During the 1950s the
official licence-issuing policy shifted away from blind protection to con-
siderations of profitability. From 1956-62 the degree of protection on
value added given to domestic producers by issuing an import licence at a
specitifc exchange rate was supposed to equal the effective exchange rate
given to exporters of that good plus a markup ranging from 15 % on raw
materials to 40 % on finished products. Licences were, however, still
issued: on a case by case basic and the de facto rules of thumb did not
change much (Halevi and Klinov-Malul, p. 238). In sum, the situation be-
tween 1950 and 1962 was that many import-substituting producers were
given absolute protection because competing imports were not permitted
and, where com
set (see below).
and, where competing imports were allowed, high exchange rates were
An overvalued currency provides an incentive to.import and a disincentive
to export. Just as measures were taken to restrict imports, measures were
also taken to encourage exports, but the quantitative significance of the
latter was considerably less than the former. The bias against export
promotion (vis-a-vis import substitution) is visible in the 1956-62 rule of
thumb for setting exchange rates on imports. Calculations of effective ex-
change rates have shown that the return in Israeli pounds for a dollar of
Throughout this paper, the exchange rate is measured by the number of
Israeli pounds required to buy one U. S. dollar. Thus, a "high" exchange
rate implies that more Israeli pounds were needed than was stated in the
R formal exchange rate.
The effective exchange rate is the total number of pounds required by the
importer to purchase a dollar' s worth of goods and includes all tariffs,
premiums, etc.- 9 -
value-added in domestic production competing with imports was greater
than the number of Israeli pounds received for a dollar
1 s worth of exports
(Michaely 1971, pp. 115-6), and this only includes imports that were
7
permitted . Thus government trade policy discriminated against produc-
tion for markets outside Israel; a situation described by a 1958 commen-
tator:
"Thus far, production has been oriented towards the local
market. Producers regard exports as merely a necessary
but not desirable addition to their production for the local
market; necessary to gain the favour of the government
and to obtain access to imported raw material. " (Kreinin,
p. 203).
The last point in the quotation refers to the principal incentive given to
exporters, the right to import inputs at a favourable rate of exchange.
This was not enough to make exporting attractive (it is included in Michae-
ly' s calculations of effective exchange rates), but did provide an incentive
for acting as an exporter in order to import an excess of supposed inputs
which could be resold at profit on the black market (Rubner pp. 187-9)
- an example of mis allocation resulting from the multiple exchange rate
system.
Having established that the import licence system which opened up the
possibility of monopoly profits for domestic producers, as well as for
licence holders, provided an incentive for import substituting production,
we will now try to quantify the extent of the protection offered. Since the
quota was usually the effective constraint on competing imports, any
calculation of the effective rate of protection based on tariff rates will be
too low. Neither can the difference between domestic and world prices be
used as an index of the degree of protection, for not all licence holders
7
Thus such a measure underestimates the degree of protection given to
import-substitute producers, whereas the effective exchange rate on
exports is an accurate measure of the incentive given to exporters.- 10 -
or import substitute producers wanted or were able to reap full monopoly
o
profits . Thus, we will have recourse to two second-best measures, which
can provide only a guide to the rate of protection; the first measure is the
effective exchange rate actually charged Dn imports between 1950 and
February 1962 and the second is the effective exchange rate after 1962.
The existing effective exchange rate on an import is a minimum measure
of protection when quotas exist, because there is no guarantee that all the
demand for import at that rate is satisfied; i. e. the effective exchange rate
9 could possibly be raised without reducing imports . The two sources for
effective exchange rates during this period are Baruh' s estimates for
1955-61 and Michaely' s work on 1949-62, which give rates by commodity
group disaggregated over 31 and 61 branches respectively . Although
not directly comparable because of the differing classification and diffe-
rences in estimation, they yield similar results. Michaely' s estimates for
1950, 1958 and 1961 are given in Table II. Such estimates can easily be
converted into the more familiar language of nominal protection rates by
dividing the effective rate by the official rate.
The level and the dispersion of the nominal rates in Table II are high
compared to other countries . Michaely also found that the degree of
scatter fluctuated from year to year but the ranking ot importers' exchange
o
Two examples: (i) institutions, which were responsible for a large
proportion of total imports, were in general not profit-maximizers,
(ii) especially in the early 1950s many domestic prices were regulated
by the government.
An increase in the effective exchange rate in such a case would reduce
quota profits, which are not included in calculation of effective exchange
rates, but would not affect the actual rate of protection.
Michaely also has a more detailed disaggregation in Vol. II of the
Hebrew version of his 1971 book.
The level is higher than existing or past rates in the industrialized
countries (Maizels, p. 141) and appears typical of LDCs; in the IBRD
study of protection in seven countries Malaya,the Philippines and
Norway tend to have lower nominal rates than Israel, Mexico similar
rates and Brazil, Chile and Pakistan higher rates (Balassa). Con-
cerning the dispersion of the nominal rates, see Michaely' s estimates
of the coefficient of variance of importer' s exchange rates and his
comments thereon (Michaely 1971, p. 105).- 11 -
12
rates remained stable , which suggests that the government followed a
consistent priority ranking. In aggregate terms the lowest rates were for
machinery and equipment, the second highest for raw materials and semi-
finished products and the highest rates for finished goods.
A tendency for the nominal tariff rates to increase between 1950 and
1962 is also clear from Table II, which suggests that protection was not
only high but was, moreover, increasing. Such a tendency would be in
contrast to stated government policy which after 1956 was aimed at re-
ducing the average level of protection. This conclusion must, however,
be modified for three reasons. First, in the presence of domestic inflation
the official exchange rate became increasingly unrealistic through the
period and increases in the non-formal component of the effective exchange
rate may be seen as offsetting this in order to maintain the status quo with
regard to protection. Michaely found that the effective exchange rate for
importers increased by more than domestic prices between 1951 and 1954,
but after that the ratio of the two remained fairly stable (Michaely 1971,
p. 94). Second, increases in the nominal rate of protection may have
reduced quota profits without affecting the supply of imports in the domestic
market; Third, changes in average tariff rates for commodity groups may
reflect changes in the commodity composition of the groups rather than
changes in actual tariffs.
A more satisfactory measure of the degree of protection granted to
domestic producers is the effective rate of protection (ERP), i.e. the
rate on value added. In addition to the effective exchange rates just dis-
cussed Michaely calculated for 1958 the "protective exchange rate", a
concept analagous to and easily converted into the standard Corden measure
of ERP. These estimates and ERPs are given in Table II. Unfortunately
they are just for one year, because this is the only year for which a
sufficiently detailed input-output table is available (Bruno 1962), and
12
Spearman' s rank correlation coefficient was applied to 277 commodities
for the period 1955-62 and all coefficients were significant at any
reasonable level (Michaely 1971, pp. 110-1).- 12 -
Table II a
Importers' Effective Exchange Rates 1950, 1958 and 1961 and
the Protective E(change Rate 1958
Commodity Branch













Fruit other than citrus
Other agricultural products
Gravel and scrap metal
Nonmetallic minerals
Heat and fish products..
Dairy products
Vegetables and fruit preserves, spices
and coffee .






Fabric*, weaving and finishing




Paper and paper, products
Printing and publishing.
Leather and leather produces
Rubber products
Manufacture and repair of tyres
Plaatic products
Basic chemicals






.Cement and lime products
Asbestos and nonmetallic mineral
products n.e.s
Oi amonds ,







Kitchen utensils, tools and galvanizing.
Other metal products
Industrial and agricultural machinery...
Household equipment
Electric motors and transformers
Electric fixtures, batteries and
accumulators
Domestic electric appliances, radio
equipment
Manufacture-of motor vehicles •
Repair of motor vehicles
Manufacture and repair of ships and
aircraft
Precision instruments and manufactures
n.e.s ;.
Miscellaneous, repairs, etc
















































































































































































































































































































0.40 2.15 2.60 2.63
Source: Effective exchange rates are from Michaely (1971), pp. 85 and 120-1, protective rates are from Michaely (1971).
pp. 115 and 126-7.Bibliothek des Inetituts
fur Weltwirtsdiaft Kiel
Table II b
Nominal Races of Protection by Cocsaodicy Branch 1950, 1958 and 1961
and Effective Rates of Protection 1938













Fruit other than citrus
Other agricultural products
Gravel and scrap netal ........
Nonmetallic minerals ;
Meat and fish products
Dairy products ,
Vegetables and fruit preserves, spices
and coffee..






Fabrics, weaving and finishing




Paper and paper products
Printing .and publishing
Leather and leather products
Rubber products ..:
Manufacture and repair of tyres
Plastic products
Basic chemicals ,
Oilt soap and detergents>;;...•...,t.k...i..
Paints.... ....




Cement and lime products
Asbestos and nonmetallic mineral products
n.e.s
Diamonds







Kitchen utensils, tools and galvanizing
Other metal products
Industrial and agricultural machinery
Household equipment.
Electric motors and transformers
Electric fixtures, batteries and accumulators
Domestic electric appliances, radio
equipment
Manufacture of motor vehicles
Repair of motor vehicles.
Manufacture and repair of ships and
aircraft '
Precision instruments and manufactures n.e.s.
Miscellaneous, repairs, etc


















































































































































































































































































































































































































11 Z 30 Z 44 Z 46 Z
Source: Nominal rates of protection were calculated by dividing the effective exchange rates in Table II a by the
formal exchange rate and subtracting one. Effective rates of protection were derived in similar manner
from the protective exchange rates of Table H a.- 14 -
analysis of the time trend of these rates is not possible. As with the nomi-
nal rates, a wide dispersion of ERPs is apparent. Some rates are even
negative, reflecting the government' s desire to encourage imports of
specific "desirable" consumer goods with an excess domestic demand,
e.g. dairy products and foreign journals. Other cases where the ERP is
below the nominal rate may reflect goods which are in excess demand as
13
inputs to domestic industries . The highest ERPs were on cement
(1964 %), several nonessential (in excess of existing domestic production)
foods, etc., precision instruments, tools, household utensils, plastic
products and general machinery. It must be reemphasised that these esti-
mates understate the true protection rate in the presence of quotas,
(cf. p. 10 ). A further source of downward bias is the level of aggregation,
since the nominal tariff on an input is likely to be less than the average
nominal tariff of the commodity group to which the input belongs (assuming
that the input is a raw material and raw materials have the lowest tariff
rates). At the individual commodity level several cases of large ERPs
have been found in Israel (Rubner, p. 169), e.g. canned sardines (844 %)
and illegal importation of crepe rubber at 789 % ERP (suggesting that the
actual protection was still higher).
An alternative approach to measuring the degree of protection enjoyed
by domestic producers is to look at nominal and effective tariff rates after
the inauguration of the import liberalisation policy in 1962. Under this
policy quotas were to be replaced by tariffs, but in the short-rund the
tariffs were to provide the same degree of protection as producers had
enjoyed before 1962. If this had been perfectly implemented then the 1962
effective tariff rates would be an ideal proxy for the level of protection
in 1961. It was not, however, perfectly implemented in that the changeover
was slow and some administrative restrictions on imports were retained.
13
Bearing in mind the ad hoc nature of licence allocation it is always
possible that an apparent anomaly may reflect administrative in-
consistency rather than any deeper plan.- 15 -
These reservations should be borne in mind when examining the estimates
14
of nominal and effective tariffs in 1967 prepared by Tov (Table III). The
1967 estimates support the view that tariffs in Israel have been high. As
with Michaely' s data the dispersion is high too and the maximum nominal
tariff was over 100 % in 15 of Tov' s 16 commodity groups, while the ERP
reached 4, 000 % in clothing and over 1, 000 % in three other groups (textiles,
electrical equipment and miscellaneous).
In this section we have indicated how the Israeli government implemented
its policy of encouraging the domestic production of import substitutes. Such
production was afforded considerable protection by the import licence system.
At times this could mean absolute protection, when no licences were issued
for the import of a particular commodity, and in general when imports were
permitted it was at a high ERP if there existed competing domestic producers.
This explains why import substituting industries should be the expanding sec-
tors during this period, but does not explain which specific industries would
expand fastest. Since prices no longer provided a satisfactory allocative
mechanism, the decision to expand an industry was primarily taken by the
government and implemented by its allocation of investment funds. The
efficiency of this system, along with the question of whether any non-import
substituting sectors could have been expanded more profitably, is analyzed
in section IV. Before looking at this potential cost of the import substitution
policy we will first try to measure its benefits, i. e., how far this policy
contributed to Israel' s economic growth between 1950 and 1962.
Ill
The concept of "import substitution" is, like "economic development", one
which all economists know the general meaning of. This has its advantages,
14
Although these apply to the end of 1967 - almost six years after the
liberalization policy had been announced - only 45-60 % of industrial out-
put by value had been covered by the programme (Tov, p. 31).- 16 -
Table III
Nominal and Effective Tariffs by Branch, 1967





Wood and wood products


















































































Source: Tov, pp. 33, 38.- 17 -
e. g., a paper may be entitled "Import Substitution in Israel 1950-62" and
its content is apparent to all, but it has its costs too. Upon trying to produce
an operationally useful definition of the term in order to quantity the degree
of import substitution in a specific instance, the concept proves to be elusive.
Yet the applied economist is prevented from making an arbitrary definition,
letting the words mean precisely what he says they mean a la Humpty
Dumpty, because he will then be accused of perverting the theoretical con-
cept, calling something "import substitution" which is not commonly under-
stood by the term and in general providing confusion rather than enlighten-
ment. Bearing these cautionary words in mind we will look at the problems
involved in quantifying import substitution and some measures which have
been proposed.
Import substitution refers to the replacement of imports by domestic
sources of supply. Thus import substitution would have taken place if the
amount of imports of a good fell while total availability of the good remained
constant. The practical problem is that the ceteris paribus assumption is
rarely valid. A critical case is when imports increase but by less than total
supply. In this case the usual practice has been not to compare the absolute
magnitude of imports at the beginning and the end of the period, but to com-
pare the final year' s imports with what imports in that year would have been
had import substitution not taken place. The problem is, of course, how to
define the latter magnitude in a non-circular manner. The practical solution
to this problem has been to assume that the normal course of events is for
imports to increase at the same pace as tdal supply and any reduction of the
ratio of imports to total supply is called import substitution. This definition








where M = imports, Z = total supply and the subscripts o and 1 refer to the
initial and final time period respectively. The absolute value of the left hand
side of expression (1) is, under this definition, a measure of the amount of- 18 -
import substitution which has taken place between period o and period 1.
The "contribution" of import substituting production to growth of domestic
production can then be obtained by dividing the lefthand side of (1) by the
change in output (X - X ). This approach to quantifying import substitution
is primarily associated with Chenery, and has underlaid almost all empirical
work on import substitution in the last fifteen years. There have been minor
variations, but the basic definition of import substitution has been the differ-
ence between what imports actually were and what they would have been had
they remained a constant proportion of total supply.
The major conceptual problem with the Chenery measure is that it can
produce ridiculous results, i. e., ones which conflict with the general under-
standing of what import substitution is. The essence of the problem lies in
the fact that import substitution is a process and as such has a time dimen-
sion, whereas the Chenery measure has no rules concerning the selection
of beginning and end periods. An example of a "ridiculous result" can be
found in the history of one of the developed countries. In 1850 Canada had a
small demand for farm machinery, all of which was imported; in 1860 demand
had increased and all the implements were domestically produced; and in
the 1860s there was a large increase in demand all of which was met by
domestic producers. The contribution of import substitution to the industry' s
growth was 100 % in the 1850s, 0 % in the 1860s and 100 % between 1850 and
1870. This last result is clearly contrary to all our understanding of what
import substitution is, for most of the increased production occurred after
imports had fallen to zero. If a period 1850 to 1970 were used we could even
ascribe all Massey-Fergusson' s sales to import substitution! This is an
extreme case, but the pitfalls of applying the Chenery measure to a long
period are clear, since this procedure will overstate what would normally
be considered import substitution and permits no distinction within the long
period between subperiods when import substitution did or did not occur.
The opposite extreme of taking very short periods can, however, be just
as undesirable, for then one meets the problem of the day to day or seasonal
or cyclical fluctuations in trade. The critical assumption behind expression- 19 -
(1) is that all changes in the marginal propensity to import can be called
import substitution, but around such "structural" changes there are short
and medium-term cyclical fluctuations and the two cannot in principle be
separated. Chenery has claimed that any period of 5-7 years is too short
to prevent such distortion (Chenery and Taylor, p. 415), but this may be
too long to prevent the overestimation discussed above. A further point
regarding the importance of the choice of time periods is that if import
substitution is calculated over x years this will in general yield a different
result than if it is calculated for the consecutive subperiods of — years
each and then summed. If imports are increasing steadily but falling
relative to total supply, the former measure will be higher than the latter.
Thus the choice of number of periods (as well as the specific terminal
dates) affects the value attributed to import substitution. The contrast
between the importance of the choice of time horizon and the indeter-
minacy of the optimal time horizon poses an insoluble dilemma for the
Chenery measure. Yet it remains the basis of empirical work on import
substitution haute de meilleur (a situation to some extent analogous to the
use of per capita GNP as a measure of economic development). The results
are calculated and quoted so long as they are "reasonable", i. e., the
Canadian example quoted above would be recognized as "ridiculous" - but
the boundary between "reasonable" and "ridiculous" is hazy.
An attempt so measure the extent of import substitution in the Israeli
manufacturing sector has been made by Pack. He calculated the ratios
M./Z. for ten non-food branches for 1950 and 1958 and the absolute import
substitution (as given by expression (1)) over the period 1950-8 (see Table
IV). The latter results are rather sloppily presented in that the unit of
measurement is not given and no figures on gross output or total supplies
are given for comparison. Thus, although Pack describes 1950-8 as "a
period of significant import substitution" (Pack p. 271), it is unclear what
the criterion of "significant" is.- 20 -
The usual contribution to growth measures, i. e., absolute import sub-
stitution divided by the increase in production in that branch, are also given
in Table IV. These indicate that import substitution was the source of over
50 % of output growth in chemicals, between 10 and 50 % in leather goods,
machinery, metals and metal products, and non-metallic minerals (stone
and cement) and less than 10 % in the remaining five branches. The choice
of which of these percentages are significant is rather arbitrary. In com-
parison with studies on other countries, however, the general impression
is one of import substitution making a below average contribution to industrial
growth in Israel. In Chenery' s original cross-sectional study, for example,
the effect of import substitution was greater in every sector except chemicals
(where his result of 50 % was marginally smaller than the Israel figure), and
in the case of the investment goods sectors considerably greater. Part of
the explanation for this discrepancy may lie in scale factors, which prevented
efficient production of some investment goods in a country of Israel
5 s size.
Pack' s analysis is restricted to the period 1950-8, because this was the
period of "significant import substitution". For completeness, however, we
should also include the remaining years up to the February 1962 devaluation.
The conventional wisdom among Israeli economists is in agreement with
Pack in saying that import substitution was not an important source of
growth 1959-61. On an aggregate level, the ratio of total imports to total
supply in the economy actually rose (Michaely 1973, ch. 6. Table 8), i.e.,
there was negative import substitution. A similar result is reported by Bruno,
who also found negative import substitution for specific commodities (Bruno
1962, ch. 5. esp. pp. 132-5).
It would be desirable for comparative purposes to quantity these con-
clusions for 1958-61 under a similar commodity classification to that of
Table IV. This is, however, made difficult by the varying classifications
used by the competent Israeli authorities , and would require considerable
The major official change was the switch in October 1958 from the Israel
Custom' s Tariff classification of imports, which had been in use since
the founding of the state, to the S.I. T. C. grouping. There are, however,
also differences in the level of aggregation of industrial output data in
successive Statistical Abstracts of Israal.- 21 -
Table IV
Measures of Import Substitution in Israel 1950-8
Sector
Chemicals











































Notes: cols. (1), (2) « ratio of imports to total supplies;
col. (3) - Chenery measure of import substitution -
(1) in text;















Sources: cols. (1) - (3) from Pack, p. 272; col. (4) calculated using
data from Lubell, p. 45, and Bruno, 1962 (the same sources as
used by Pack).- 22 -
groundwork in reclassifying the trade and production data. Some preliminary
conclusions regarding the ratio of imports to domestic production in similar
commodity groups to Table IV can, however, be made for 1958-60 from
1 fi
available data . Caution must be used in interpreting the following figures
because it is not always clear that the classifications are perfectly consistent
(this problem was especially severe for the categories of basic metal products
and machinery). The most striking feature of these preliminary calculations
were the large increases in /x in chemicals (from 25. 6 % to 70. 1 %),
textiles and clothing (from 6. 1 % to 17. 5 %), paper and printing (11.7 % to
33.7 %) and electrical appliances (from 33. 3 % to 75. 2 %). These figures not
only point to negative import substitutions between 1958 and 1960, but are
so drastic as to suggest minimal import substitution in the whole period
17
1950-60 . Similar phenomena occurred in wood and carpentry, metals and
metal products and machinery, although the data for these groups appear less
comparable with that of Table IV. In the leather and non-metallic minerals
groups the /X ratio remained stable 1958-60, suggesting that the gains fi
import substitution between 1950 and 1958 were retained.
1 fi
The data sources used are Statistical Abstract of Israel 1962, pp. 336-7,
Statistical Abstract of Israel 1964, p. 153, and Bruno (1962), pp. 36-7.
17
The Chenery method of calculating the extent of import substitution has
been criticized by Morley and Smith for omitting the intermediate demands
generated by import substitution and thus understating its full extent.
Since the Morley-Smith formula rests on the same critical assumption
regarding changes in the marginal propensity to import as Chenery' s
measure, the criticisms regarding the arbitrariness and importance of
the time horizon still apply. It will be recalled that these criticisms
suggest that all measures a la Chenery (including Morley-Smith) will tend
to overstate the degree of import substitution. Nevertheless, once the
rationale of assuming that all deviations from a constant propensity to
import are to be put down to import substitution is accepted, then the
Morley-Smith modification is logically superior to the Chenery method.
Use of the logically inferior method in the hope that the two biases would
be mutually offsetting is clearly a dubious scientific approach. Thus, one
of our future tasks will be to calculate Morley-Smith measures of import
substitution for the period under consideration. Although an input-output
table exists for 1958 (Bruno 1962), such a task is complicated by data
problems similar to those mentioned in footnote 12.- 23 -
The results of the previous paragraph illustrate the importance of the
choice of terminal years in measuring import substitution. Before drawing
conclusions for the 1958-60 period, a final set of calculations will be
presented which may help our understanding of the cause of import substi-
tuting industrialization in the 1950s. The period 1950-8 was subdivided into
four year periods, 1950-4 and 1954-8, and the results in Table IV were
reestimated for each subperiod (Table V). The results in Table V indicate
some variation in the timing of import substitution. Textiles and clothing,
nonmetallic minerals and electrical appliances all show more import sub-
stitution taking place between 1950 and 1954 than in the 1954-8 period. In
the remaining sectors, which include Pack' s four biggest import-substi-
tuting sectors, 1954-8 was the period of greatest import substitution; In sum,
the bulk of the 1950-8 import substitution occurred in the last four years of
the period.
The time path of import substitution in Israel' s manufacturing sector
which emerges from the above data is one of slow progress up to 1954,
followed by substantial import substitution between 1954 and 1958 and then
a major reversal of this trend in 1959 and 1960. In Section I it was predicted
that import substitution would be high in Israel' s early years, just because
the country started life with a high import/GNP ratio. The fact that this
is not revealed by the 1950-4 results reflects the tremendous increase in
aggregate demand in the early 1950s, which was primarily associated
with the mass immigration of 1948-51. Thus, although domestic production
was increasing rapidly, it could not keep up with demand and import ratios
remained high. These ratios only started to fall significantly in the mid
1950s. The decline in import ratios in the 1954-8 period was sufficient to
make import-substitution appear as a significant source of industrial
growth in Israel 1950-8, although its contribution was less than that found
in other developing countries. A major question mark over the succes of
the policy of industrialization by import substitution is, however, raised
by the 1958-60 results which show the gains of 1950-8 being lost in most
sectors. This result may be dismissed because of the imperfect data, butTable V
Import Substitution in Israel 1950-4 and 1954-8
Sector
Chemicals




























































































Sources: Lubell, p. 45; Bruno (1962).- 25 -
the uniformity of the conclusions seems too strong to permit such an easy
way out. Explanation of the 1958-60 phenomenon more likely rests in tha
easing of the quantitative restrictions as the climate of opinion, which even-
tually led to the import liberalization policy of the 1960s, started to be felt
(Michaely, 1973). Thus the 1954-8 import substitution is revealed as an
essentially forced process, i. e. caused by the physical prevention of imports
which reduced the /Z ratio, and not as part of any long-term source of
growth.
A word of caution concerning the conclusions drawn in the previous para-
graph is appropriate. We have already discussed at some length the im-
portance of the choice of terminal years when making Chenery-type calcu-
lations, and the differences between 1950-4 and 1954-8 may be explained
by the position of the end years in the business cycle. The early 1950s were
a boom period in Israel, but by 1953-4 the effects of this were slackening
off and the ratio of domestic production to imports may have been below its
trend value in 1954. Conversely, 1958 v/as part of a boom period when
domestic production was expanding and the ratio of domestic production to
imports was above its trend value. Thus the apparent increase in import
substitution in 1954-8, compared to 1950-4 is in part illusory, i. e. not reflec-
ting any structural change. A second source of bias in our calculations is
the use of the official exchange rate in valuing imports. As the official ex-
change rate diverged further and further from the effective exchange rate
in the second half of the 1950s, the official import data became more and
more underestimates of the actual value of imports. Thus a reduction in
the ratio of imports to domestic production reflects, at least in part, the
change in the relative official prices rather than a change in real values.
If this is true of the 1954-8 period then it is a fortiori true of 1958-60 and
our conclusions regarding the lack of importance of import substitution in
the latter period are reinforced. Thus, given the technical attributes and
limitations of the method used to estimate the extent of import substitution,
the conclusions in the previous paragraph must be treated v/ith caution,
since it is unclear to what extent they are explaining real phenomena.- 26 -
The Chenery method of estimating import substitution is far from per-
fect, and its results must be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless,
changes in the rate of import substitution over subperiods of the 1950s do
appear to have occurred. After a slow start import substitution gathered
pace behind a wall of quantitative restrictions, but few of these gains
could be retained once absolute protection diminished (even though effec-
tive protection remained high, cf. section II). Over the whole decade in
only one manufacturing sector, leather goods, was import substitution a
major source of growth (about one third of the increase in production).
In three sectors (machinery,non-metallic minerals and metals and metal
products) it may have been a source of as much as 20 % of the growth in
production, but in all other sectors its contribution to growth was negligible
(less than 10 %). These conclusions are in direct contrast to Pack' s
characterization of 1950-8 as a period of significant import substitution
1 ft
and, indeed, to the whole conventional wisdom of the 1950s being the
decade of import substitution until the opportunities for substitution began
to disappear around 1958. Our results suggest that these opportunities
were never very great and the apparent import substitution between 1950
and 1958 was on the whole a temporary phenomenon concentrated in the
years 1954-8. Thus, despite the strong bias of government policy in the
direction of supporting import substitution, its benefits for Israel do not
appear to have been very significant.
IV
The major economic cost of a policy of import substitution is that the
interference with the price mechanism can lead to misallocation of re-
sources. Such misallocation can occur in the choice of products, markets
and factor intensity. By granting incentives to specific import-substitute
producing industries the government may be encouraging sectors which do
18
A recent restatement has been made by Bruno:
"Import substitution was a factor of considerable importance in the
industrial (and earlier agricultural) growth of the 1950s, when the
food, textile, fertilizers and paper industries were the main ones
developed" (Bruno 1972, p. 97).- 27 -
in fact have the greatest social profitability. Similarly, by turning producers'"
attention to the domestic market, the government may be diverting goods from
more profitable external markets. After determining which sectors were in
fact encouraged by government policy, these two questions will be analyzed
together using the tool of domestic resource cost. The third source of mis-
allocation arises from the fact that most capital goods were imported in
Israel and, although effective exchange rates on capital goods were lower
than those on consumer goods, imports of capital goods required licenses
and could be subject to quantitative restriction. The consequences o± these
restrictions will be analyzed below. A final economic cost of the regulatory
mechanisms which accompanied the government' s import substitution policy
was the waste of resources associated with attempts to avoid compliance
with the regulations. Some of these have been alluded to above and further
(at times staggering) examples are given by Rubnor, but since such costs are
in the aggregate unquantifiable they will not be dealt with here.
Government policy in Israel 1950-62 was to encourage import substitution
by offering protection to domestic industry (Section II). Upon comparing the
effective exchange rates by sector in Table III with the measures of import
substitution in Table IV, however, somewhat anomalous results are obtained.
There is no systematic relationship between the level of the ERP and the
measure of import substitution in individual industries. If anything, the
relationship is in the wrong direction, for the two sectors with the lowest
degree of import substitution had the highest ERPs (clothing and electrical
appliances). In the previous section doubt was cast upon the relevance of
the ranking in Table IV, but, even allowing for error, an anomaly remains
in that the only sector for which there was consistently strong evidence of
import substitution (leather) has one of the lowest ERPs in Table III.
The calculated ERPs provide little guide as to which sectors were in
fact encouraged by government policy, because they are only minimum
measures of effective protection. The ERPs understate total protection by
the amount of potential quota profits, which varied from sector to sector.- 28 -
Thus, a ranking of sectors by ERP would not necessarily approximate a
ranking by total protection. As was indicated above, protection tended to be
absolute for existing or intending domestic producers, and it appears that
tariff and quota policy was fairly neutral between import-substitute produc-
ing sectors. The question of which sectors were encouraged by the govern-
ment' s import-substitution policy thus becomes a matter of examining how
potential domestic producers came into existence.
The major source of growth in Israel in the 1950s was capital accumu-
lation (Gaathon). The stock of capital in industry rose by 432 % between
January 1950 and January 1962, and the capital/output ratio more than
doubled. In the same period net domestic savings were practically zero,
i. e. the investment was financed by capital inflows. A significant proportion
of the capital inflow was channelled to public and private producers via
government agencies. The procedure was for the enterprise to obtain approved
status, in order to be eligible for Development Budget loans. Public financing
accounted for some 40 % of total investment in industry in the 1950s. Since the
share of financing approved enterprises was approximately 50 : 50 and many
such enterprises could not have been started without government partici-
pation, the allocation of development loans determined the location of about
19 three quarters of all industrial investment
The sectoral allocation of government development loans up to 1958 is
given in Table VI. Some 70 % of the loeans went to four sectors: textiles,
metal-working, chemicals and food. The accompanying text in the source
of Table VI, written by a senior official in the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry responsible for approving enterprises, makes it clear that the
choice of receiving sectors was a matter of deliberate policy, e. g., he
talks of "industries whose development the Government is especially
interested in promoting, namely, textiles, metal-working, and chemicals"
19
The source for this paragraph is the Economic Planning Authority in
the Prime Minister" s Office: Israel Economic Development, Past
Progrss and Plan for Future (Jerusalem 1968) pp. 404-6.- 29 -
(Salamon, p. 61). These were clearly the sectors expected to make the
greatest strides in import substitution, and were thus the beneficiaries of
the government' s discriminatory investment allocation policy.
The government' s loans policy provides an explanation of why metals
and textiles were first and second among the sectors in Table IV and chemi-
cals fourth in terms of the increase in domestic output 1950-8.
This rapid domestic expansion was partly responsible for the high import
substitution measures which were found for these sectors up to 1958. It was
shown, however, that over a longer period these measures proved illusory
and the success of government policy to encourage import substitution was
doubtful. Nevertheless, this policy did presumably have some effect insofar
as it fostered greater expansion of the metals, textiles and chemicals sectors
than would have been v/arranted under free product and factor prices. Thus,
the question arises of how far this distortion of the price mechanism led to
a suboptional sectoral structure of the economy.
In view of the persistent and large import surplus which existed throughout
the period 1950-62 (and still exists today), the binding constraint on economic
growth in Israel has usually been identified as the foreign exchange con-
straint (e.g. Bruno 1970, Chenery and Bruno). In such a situation the relevant
criterion for determining the social profitability of a project or industry is
the domestic resource cost (DRC), i. e. , the real opportunity cost in terms
of total domestic resources of producing (or saving) a net marginal unit of
foreign exchange. Estimates of DRCs for the ten sectors of Table IV plus the
two leading export sectors are given for 1958-60 in Table VII. These estima-
tes reveal differences in DRCs between sectors and the extent to which
DRCs diverge from the formal exchange rate of 1. 80. Also included in Table
VII are Bruno' s estimates of the total rate of return to capital in these
sectors in 1958; this more common profitability measure is given for compa-
rative purposes.Table VI








































































































Source: Israel Economic Bulletin, X, 2-4, Dec. 1958, p. 61.- 31 -
The most striking feature of Table VII is the high DRCs of the sectors
specifically encouraged by the government, i. e. chemicals, metals and
textiles. On the DRC criterion electrical appliances, paper and printing
and machinery offered betiar chances of easing the foreign exchange
constraint, but these were ignored. The reason why the leather industry
expanded rapidly and provided the only substantial source of import sub-
stitution is revealed by the high rate of return on capital in that sector.
The conclusion from Table VII is that the government' s choice of import-
substituting induestries was the worst possible and that the system of
resource allocation encouraged by the government was detrimental to the
government' s own goal, insofar as manufacturing industry was concentra-
20
ted in the areas where Israel' s comparative advantage was least . Com-
parison with the DRCs of the two major export industries, diamonds and
citrus, also suggests that the import-substituting-industrialization policy
may have been a suboptimal means of easing the foreign exchange constraint,
for foreign currency could have been, earned more cheaply in terms of
domestic resources by expanding diamond and citrus production.
The DRC method does have some drawbacks which require modification
of the above conclusion. DRC is a marginal measure at current prices.
Thus, the high values for textiles, chemicals and metals may reflect that
after the expansion of the 1950s these industries had just reached a rising
section of their cost curves, i. e., the DRCs were much lower in earlier
years. Given the nature of these three industries, however, it seems un-
likely that they would possess such production functions. For most manu-
facturing industries in a country of Israel' s size we would expect unit
costs to be falling over the relevant range. Since such industries were also
price-takers in the world market and industrial prices do not fluctuate
widely DRC should be a fairly consistent measure over time, at least in
the medium-term. This is not the case with citrus and diamonds, where
20
This was recognized at the time by engineers and technicians in specific
situations, but they had little influence on government policy. A major
example (as in many LDCs) was the construction of the steel town near
Acre (Rubner, p. 233).Table VII































































Source: Bruno, 1962, p. 101-2, 111, 146; figures in brackets, Pack, p. 372.- 33 -
Israel produces a significant share of the world output and where prices
do fluctuate; e. g., the rising DRC in citrus 1958-60 primarily reflects
falling world prices. Thus the decision to encourage import-substitutes
rather than citrus and diamond exports cannot be condemned solely on
the basis of the DRC estimates. It is also necessary to know the shape
21 of the demand curves for the latter goods
A final restriction to our conclusion that the government encouraged
the wrong industries is that it is conceivable that the foreign exchange
constraint was not completely binding, since capital imports were suffi-
22 cient to cover the trade deficit throughout the 1950-62 period .In this
case DRC is perhaps the wrong angle from which to approach project
23 evaluation . The rates of return on capital in Table VI do, however,
reinforce the conclusion obtained from the DRCs. More problematical is
the possibility that non-economic factors dominated the government' s
objective function and allocative criterion based on profitability are irre-
levant to an assessment of government policy. There is, however, no
reason to believe that an economically more logical set of allocative
priorities would have drastically damaged other objectives (e. g,, regional,
cultural, etc., development).
Since capital goods were primarily imported and all imports required
licences, there was also misallocation in the factor market, especially in
the short-run. The timing of imports was affected by the process of licence
21
There may also have been problems of inelastic supply of diamonds
_ and citrus products.
Although this is conceivable, it is highly unlikely that the government
>£t the time considered reduction of the import surplus to be less than
crucial. Certainly, academic economists considered it to be one of the
goals of the economy (and rightly so) in the 1950s (e.g., Patinkin,
23 pp. 126-7).
Theoretically, DRC is just one of several equivalent statements of the
social marginal productivity (SMP) investment criterion. In a world
of imperfect data, however, it can be argued that the relevant SMP
format is the one which isolates the variable whose shadow price is
most crucial and least precisely known (Bruno, 1967).- 34 -
issuing and this lack of complete control by the entrepreneur made it
difficult to keep inventories always at the optimum level. A related problem
arose when a piece of capital equipment required several component parts.
If the parts did not arrive together because of administrative delay, then
the whole equipment would be unutilized. As prophylactic measures entre-
preneurs compensated for potential bottlenecks by holding excess inven-
tories and by purchasing capital equipment before it was needed, both of
which led to above optimal capital/labour rates in the sectors in which
entrepreneurs could implement these strategies. A final problem in the
factor market was the possibility of the government refusing an import
licence and forcing the producer to buy a more expensive or inferior quality
domestic good, although such restrictions do not appear to have been
widely applied to capital goods. In sum, the presence of quantitative
restrictions and government administration of the purchase of imported





The allocation of capital equipment was further distorted by the fact that
interest rates were not uniform. The Law of Interest set maximum interest
rates of 9 % up to 1957 and 11 % after that. At these rates demand for
credit exceeded supply and there developed a "free market" outside the
banking system. The private cost of capital between 1954 and 1960 has
been estimated at 25 %, while in the same period the cost of capital obtained
by industry via development budget loans was 8-9 % (Ben-Shahar, pp. 99,
25 45) . We are not here concerned with all the misallocation arising from
the complex interest rate structure, but only with that which arose from the
government policy of allocating development loans to potential import -
24
Unfortunately, the conclusion of this paragraph is qualitative rather than
quantitative, because any attempt to quantify the costs mentioned here
would require considerable research at the microeconomic level. Never-
theless, these sources of misallocation do appear to have been signi-
ficant at the enterprise level and have been commented upon by Israel' s
25 economists (e. g., Michaely 1973, ch. 6-3).
Both figures are nominal rates, i. e., not allowing for inflation.- 35 -
substitute producers. Thus, the chemicals, textiles and metals industries
enjoyed an artificially high wage-rental ratio, which may have led to a sub-
optimal labour intensity. A ranking of industrial sub-branches is available
(Bruno 1962, p. 62) and, although it does not follow the same commodity
classification as we have been using, chemicals and metals emerge as the
most capital-intensive sectors apart from oil refining. This is, however, not
too surprising since these sectors "are known to require very heavy invest-
ment per worker" (Bruno 1962, p. 61), and it must be noted that textiles
appear among the least capital intensive sectors. Thus, a mere ranking of
sectors by capital intensity is not a useful test of the sectoral misallocation
of capital, because such a ranking will be dominated by the intrinsic technical
requirement of each sector. A superior test would require comparison of
sectoral factor intensities in Israel with the "normal pattern" in a country
of Israel' s size and endowments . In the absence of such a test, we are
left with a similar conclusion to that of the previous paragraph, i.e., mis-
allocation almost certainly occured in the factor market as a result of the
government' s import substitution policy but it is difficult to quantify the
extent of this misallocation.
In sum, the attempt to encourage industrialization via import substitution
between 1950 and 1962 had definite costs in the form of misallocation of
resources. The clearest case of this was the government' s specific encourage-
ment of the chemical, textile and metal industries, which were in fact the
sectors where Israel' s comparative advantage was least. Encouragement
of these industries by means of development loans may also have led to
their obtaining a greater share of capital than was economically warranted.
More generally, import substitution may have been an inferior approach to
easing the foreign exchange constraint, although this hypothesis was not
In view of Israel' s relative abundance of human capital, such a test
would ideally be based on a more sophisticated definition of factor
intensity involving the breakdown of "capital intensity" into "human
capital intensity" and "physical capital intensity" (cf. Lary).
Estimates of these intensities will form the subject of future research.- 36 -
thoroughly tested. Finally, the quantitative import controls associated with
the government policy may have reduced producers' efficiency, i.e., their
ability to remain close to their optimum factor proportions, as well as con-
sumers' utility.
V
The aim of this part of the paper has been to critically examine the policy
of encouraging industrialization by import substitution, which was pursued
by the Israeli government up to February 1962. After a brief survey of rea-
sons why such a policy was adopted, the extent of protection enjoyed by
domestic producers v/as estimated in section II. Effective protection was
high and often absolute, a finding which supported the characterization of
government policy as one of import substitution. Previous judgements of the
success of this policy have been that it did provide a substantial source of
industrial growth through the 1950s, but also led to misallocation of resources.
These judgements were tested in sections III and IV where it was found that the
contribution to industrial growth of import substitution was rather small and
that misallocation of resources did in fact exist. Thus our conclusion is that
the government policy v/as not very successful, since it incurred costs and
generated little benefit in return.
Limitations imposed on this conclusion by the techniques and the data used
have been stressed in the text. A further limitation is that import substitution
is a development policy, whereas in looking at the benefits of the policy we
have only dealt with its contribution to growth. Thus measures such as those
used in Table IV and V to calculate the contribution of import substitution to
an industry' s growth ignore the externalities and linkage effects which are
an integral part of the theory of import substitution. This problem is partly
overcome in the examination of costs of the policy, since the data in Table
VI are based on an input-output framework. Nevertheless, even such a
framework cannot take into account the full dynamic effect of externalities.- 37 -
2. Policy towards Imports of Manufactured Goods since 1962
In February 1962 Israel's Minister of Finance announced a "programme
for stabilizing the economy". The major features of this programme were
devaluation of the Israeli pound and an undertaking to reduce the protec-
tion enjoyed by domestic producers against foreign competition:-
"The government will gradually lower the walls of over-protection of
domestic industry against imports. In order to make manufacturing
and agriculture stand on the basis of cheap and efficient production,
the government intends to restrict the ceiling of rates of protective
tariffs and to eliminate the quantitative restrictions of imports.
Local production will have therefore to compete with import goods. "
(from the text of the Minister of Finance's policy declaration).
The policy of import liberalization assumed in practice a two-stage
procedure. The first stage involved a shift from administrative protection
by quotas to tariffs and lasted from 1962 to 1968. The second stage,
originally planned to be completed by 197 5, involved reduction in the level
and dispersion of the tariffs.
The aim of the remainder of the paper is to evaluate the government's
success in forcing local production to compete with imports and the
consequences for Israel's economic development of the import liberalization
policy. The first section traces chronologically the progress of the
first stage of liberalization and attempts to measure the proportion of
Israel's industrial sector which had to face competing imports. Section
II examines the progress made since 1968 in reducing the level and
dispersion of tariff rates, and new estimates of the tariff rate as of
1st January 1972 are made for this purpose. The third section analyses
the consequences of the policy for Israel's industrial development and
concentrates primarily on the question of whether tariff reductions were- 38 -
destructive to previously protected industries. Also contained in section
III is a brief examination of the benefits of the liberalization policy
in reducing misallocation of resources. Finally, an attempt is made in
section IV to provide an overall assessment of the liberalization policy.
The import quota system existing in Israel before 1962 was defended
on the grounds that it permitted the government to use discriminatory
protection to hasten the structural change required for economic develop-
ment. This was primarily interpreted in terms of encouraging the produc-
tion of import substitutes. A few notable successes (e. g. rubber tyres)
occurred and there was a general impression that import substitution was
taking place in the mid-1950s. In the years after 1958, however, it
became increasingly apparent that this was no longer the case. Once it
became accepted that the balance of payments benefits of administrative
protection were uncertain, policy makers' attention turned towards the
costs of such protection, i. e., the ensuing misallocation of resources
(according to static welfare criteria). Replacement of quotas by tariffs
would reveal the extent to which distortion of the price system was
A27 present
In terms of the domestic political decision process the New Economic
Policy of 1962 could be seen as a stage in a long-running debate between
proponents of the price mechanism and proponents of adminstrative judge-
27
The extent of distortion under a quota regime can also be calculated.
The point is that such a calculation would not make the same impression
on non-economists as a tariff rate does.- 39 -
ment in determining the priorities and incentives to development. The
leading proponents of the former view were the "Chicago" economists in
the Hebrew University and the Bank of Israel, while the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry was the centre for the latter view. The New
Economic Policy was a victory for the economists. The war was, however,
not over, and its further progress is the main theme of the present section.
Implementation of the liberalization policy was slow, and, although
it is useful for benchmark purposes to associate a specific year with the
policy, there was no clearcut change in 1962 itself. Import liberalisation
can in fact be traced back to 1956, but before 1962 it only applied to raw
materials (Davidov, p. 49). After 1962 eligibility for liberalization was
broadened, although agricultural products v/ere excluded almost from the
start (despite the Minister of Finance's statement quoted above) because
of pressure from the Ministry of Agriculture and religious reasons
(Tov, p. 30). The pace of liberalization of industrial imports in terms of
the proportion .of Israeli output affected can be seen in Table VIII. Tov
has reservations about the reliability of the data in column 2, and since
the last column is the ratio of two magnitudes from different sources it
too may be suspect. Nevertheless the figures in this Table suggest the
orders of magnitude. Output of liberalized products is only known for the
year in which the liberalization occurred. Therefore we cannot add the
components of column 3 to find the percentage of liberalized output. Instead,
assumptions must be made of the rate of growth up to 1867 of previously
liberalized goods. Tov's statement that by the end of 1967 some 45 to 60 %
of the value of industrial output had been covered by the liberalization
programme represents limits based on 0 % or 20 % growth rates for
liberalized output (Tov, p. 31). The two questions which this raises are:
(i) what goods were excluded from the programme and v/hy? and (ii) why
was the process so slow?- 40 -
The above estimates indicate that a large proportion of manufacturing
industries were not made to face liberalized imports. Some further
liberalization occurred after 1967, but its extent was small and most of
the remaining goods had by then been specifically exempted. A major sector
which escaped liberalization was the food processing industry, which
although categorised as part of manufacturing industry was included in the
exemption of agricultural goods. The motor vehicle components industry
was also specifically excluded from discussion, as were certain goods on
which binding promises had been given to entrepreneurs that competing
imports would be excluded for a specified time period. The broadest group
to be excluded, representing some 20 % of industrial output, were those
goods and services not traded in the world market. These are typically
thought of as goods with high transport costs or repair services carried
out in small shops, although it is unclear whether all the goods and
services exempted on this ground were in fact non-tradable. No study
has been done on this issue, but the argument has often been made that,
if liberalization of those goods and services was irrelevant, then it would
have done no harm to have proceeded with it, thus preventing any error
of judgement as to what was in fact tradable. In sum, liberalization had
by the late 1960s affected a significant proportion of manufacturing
industry. On the other hand, many producers had escaped the need to
face liberalized imports and remained under the shelter of administrative
protection.
The liberalization process was distinguished by its slowness as well
as its incompleteness. In order to understand why this was the case it is
necessary to look at the machinery of liberalization. Implementation rested
with a Public Commission consisting of representatives of several
ministries (in particular, the Ministries of Finance and Commerce And
Industry) and other organisations (especially the Histadrut and the
Manufacturers' Association). The Public Commission discussed each- 41 -
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diamonds and is turnover at 1965 prices
Source: Tov, p. 31.- 42 -
product individually on the basis of recommendations prepared by sub-
committees consisting of government representatives and coordinated by
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. This machinery was not conducive
to rapid progress because no timetable was set and separate consideration
of each product ensured a lengthy process. Representation on the Public
Commission of bodies fearing liberalization was also a retarding influence.
A further retarding factor was the dominant role occupied by the Ministry
of Commerce and Industry, which retained a predilection for discretionary
trade policy. This Ministry had representatives on the Public Commission,
including the Chairman; it controlled which goods were brought before the
Commission; and it controlled the subcommittees responsible for preparing
the material used in the Committee's discussions.
The influence of groups unconvinced of the virtues of the market
mechanism not only slowed and limited the liberalization movement, but
also tended to distort the original aims of the policy. A guideline often
stated by members of the Commission was "efficiency rather than
elimination", i.e., import liberalization should encourage efficiency within
an industry but not lead to the industry's elimination. Thus the Commission
became concerned with each industry's technical efficiency, but not with
efficient allocation at a macroeconomic level, which had originally been the
28
policy's prime intent . In consequence, the Public Commission did not
expect the tariffs which it set to be uniform, although an aim of the New
Economic Policy had been to reduce the dispersion of tariff rates. The
usual procedure for the Commission was to establish the domestic cost
if production were "efficient", and then to set a tariff which made imports
28
There was some macro allocation effect, since new ventures were no
longer offered total protection, but this was not at the front of the
stage.- 43 -
competitive with domestic production. The tariff rate could be set below the
price-equalizing tariff to give domestic producers an added incentive, but on
some goods the tariff was set higher to compensate domestic producers for
non-price advantages possessed by imports (snob appeal, brand names, etc.)
or as a reward for good behaviour (e. g., for agreeing to limit price
increases). Between 1962 and 1967 the dispersion of effective rates of
protection was high and showed no tendency to fall (Tov, p. 29).
An overview of the import liberalization programme at the end of its
first stage presents a rather negative picture. Six years after the
announcement of the New Economic Policy about half of Israel's manufactured
output faced liberalized imports. Even this would have had only a small
effect on resource allocation since each product had to face imports priced
competitively with production conditions in Israel. Thus, if an Israeli
entrepreneur was producing a good in which Israel had a comparative
disadvantage but was producing it efficiently given Israeli conditions,
then he would generally suffer no price disadvantage vis-a-vis competing
imports.
In looking for reasons for this lack of progress in achieving the original
aims of the New Economic Policy, one does not have to look further than
the powerful positions occupied by interest groups attached to the pre 1962
system of administrative protection. A major cost of any policy which is
adopted and maintained for a period of years is that it can build up such
interest groups, both because some peiople are benefiting materially from
the old system and also because many people's minds, perhaps especially
among administrators, come to accept the existing procedure as best and
29 fear that chaos will follow any fundamental change . Thus in contemplating
any major policy change great care must be taken that it is a correct move,
29
For an argument of how the "internal, self-contradictory logic" of a
system of quota restrictions places administrators in a vicious circle
of everincreasing ad hoc measures, see Bhagwati and Krueger.- 44 -
in order to obtain some benefit to counter the cost of overcoming opposition
to the policy and also to avoid the need to abandon the policy and go through
the costly implementation procedure once more. Such considerations are
often implicitly ignored by economists who sometimes appear to want to try
a new policy to see if it will work and ignore the practical costs of policy
changes.
II
Despite the slow pace of implementation of the liberalization policy
between 1962 and 1967, the prospect in 1968 for those favouring liberaliz-
ation was quite bright. A significant proportion of industrial output did
face liberalized imports. Even if the tariff rates were not such as to
improve macroeconomic resource allocation, they did serve to pinpoint areas
30 with a high degree of protection . This made it easier to obtain a
consensus during the subsequent stage of reducing and equalising tariff
rates. Furthermore, attitudes in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry
were changing and new ministers were increasingly well-disposed towards
liberalization. Finally, 1968 saw the recommencement of rapid economic
growth after the 1965-7 recession, and this provided a more amenable
environment for tariff reductions.
The commitment to reduce and equalise tariff rates appears to have
been kept since 1968 and progress has been fairly rapid, despite interrup-
tions caused by the military situation. An initial step was taken in November
1966 with a 10 % reduction in the tariffs on 330 imported manufacturers.
In October 1968 a general 15 % reduction took place and this was followed
30
The goal of placing all goods' tariff rates on comparable terms was
thwarted to some extent by the retention of specific duties, although
by the 1970s these only applied to about 5 % of total imports (primarily
vehicles, agricultural goods, alcoholic beverages and tobacco).- 45 -
in January 1969 by a progressive cut (by an average of 20 %) aimed at
reducing the dispersion of rates. In 1969 the decision was taken to move
progressively to a standard rate of protection on domestic production of
I£ 5. 5 per dollar of value added in 197 5 (with the exception of consumer
goods subject to snob appeal which would be permitted a rate of I£ 6 / $),
31 i. e., an effective rate of protection of 57 % . Since then tariff changes
have occurred at frequent intervals: January 1970, January 1971, April 1972,
June 1972, January and February 1973. An opposing influence was the
imposition of a defence levy of 20 % on virtually all imports (excluding only
a small number of government-purchased essential items and rough diamonds),
but up until the October 1973 war the declared policy appeared to be on
32 schedule for achieving its goal by 1975 (Michaely 1973, ch. 3. 5) . It is
unclear at the time of writing what the consequences of the war and its
33 aftermath will be for the liberalization policy
No quantitative measures of the extent of the tariff reductions since
1968 are avaible, although Michaely's assertion that they were on schedule
at such an advanced date as mid 197 3 suggests that they have been large.
In an attempt to fill this gap we made estimates of average tariff rates
at the end of 1971 by BTN chapters (see appendix). The procedure followed
was to calculate the nominal and valorem tariff on each item and then to
aggregate the calculated rates weighted by the value of 1971 imports. The
31
Adoption of this goal was linked with Israel's negotiations with the EEC,
which v/ill be discussed in greater detail in a later paper dealing with
the export side of Israel's foreign trade.
After the August 1971 devaluation of the Israeli pound from I£ 3. 5 / $
to I£ 4. 2 / $ the target was reset at I£ 6. 5 / $, i. e., an ERP of 55 %. 33
The short-run consequences of the v/ar have been adverse for import
liberalization policy, since tariffs have been increased and an import
deposit scheme initiated for all imports of value greater than I£ 5, 000,
but it is unclear how permanent these measures will prove to be.-46 -
weighting system used is far from satisfactory since it will produce
biased results; high tariffs on price elastic goods will receive too little
weight and low tariffs on such goods will receive too much weight. The
reason for adopting this weighting system is that any ideal system, e. g.,
weighting by what imports would be in the absence of any trade barriers,
would involve a much more complicated exercise, while the estimates given
here do at least suggest orders of magnitude.
The estimates in the appendix are summarized for the products of
twelve industries in Table IX, where they are compared with Tov's estimates
for 1967 (i. e., at the completion of the first stage of liberalization). The
two sets of estimates are not on identical bases, since Tov uses as weights
the value saved in producing commodity x in Israeli pounds. The difference
in weighting systems probably biases the 1971 estimates downwards vis-a-vis
the 1967 estimates. Such a bias would, however, not be of sufficient order
of magnitude to explain the large reduction in the total tariff rate for industrial
goods revealed in Table IX. The major conclusion is that the liberalization
policy did indeed produce a considerable reduction in the height of tariffs
facing imported industrial goods. Tariff reductions were applied to all
branches except non-metallic minerals and products, where tariffs on
ceramic and glass products remained high (105 % and 51 % respectively).
34
The largest reductions were in electrical and transport equipment .
The liberalization measures were intended to reduce the dispersion of
tariff rates as well as their height. To test whether this did in fact
occur, the coefficient of variance was calculated for the two columns of
Table IX. By this measure the dispersion of tariff rates did fall over
34
The estimates for transport equipment are less reliable than those for
other branches, because large number of specific duties on the goods make
the tariff rates difficult to estimate. Tov omits customs duties on
imported vehicles from his estimates, which clearly leads to considerable
divergence between the coverage of the 1967 and 1971 estimates in Table II.- 47 -
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the period. A more thorough test would involve a much greater degree of
disaggregation since large variations may be hidden within the commodity
groups, but this was not possible with Tov's published data. Examination
of the estimates in the appendix and of the individual tariff rates on which
they are based suggests that by the end of 1971 within-group dispersion
was large only with regard to beverages and tobacco products. This contrasts
with the maximum nominal tariffs quoted by Tov, which are over 100 % in all
branches except machinery (cf. Table III above).
The discussion so far has been in terms of nominal tariffs, but the
more economically meaningful measure when dealing with distortions resulting
from protection is the effective tariff rate. Estimates of effective tariffs
in 1967 are given in Table III and it can be seen that they are considerable
higher than the nominal tariffs. An attempt was made to estimate effective
tariffs for 1971 using the appendix data and Chen's input-output tables for
1968/9, but the results were unsatisfactory because even Chen's most
35 desaggregated tables (30 x 30) were insufficiently detailed . Examination
of the nominal tariff rates in the appendix reveals that effective tariffs were
certainly higher than nominal tariffs for most goods in 1971. For example,
the average nominal tariff on raw hides and leather was 15. 6 % (and most
items in this category were duty free), while that on leather goods was
83. 6 %. A similar pattern of higher nominal tariffs on finished goods is
visible with respect to food, chemicals, paper, clothing and textiles and
base metals. Thus, it can be said with confidence that a significant
difference between nominal and effective tariffs remained in 1971, although
no quantitative measure is available.
35
The insufficient disaggregation was reflected in large diagonal elements.
Thus, for example, the imported inputs to the "leather and products"
industry were mainly "leather and products" and the estimated effective
tariff did not differ greatly from the nominal tariff.- 49 -
In sum, the policy of import liberalization has followed two fairly
distinct stages. In the first, which lasted until the end of 1967, slow
but steady progress was made in replacing quota restrictions by tariffs,
but there was little change in the level or structure of protection. In the
second stage substantial progress has been made in reducing the level
and the dispersion of nominal tariff rates. In general this should also have
reduced the level of effective protection, but in the absence of estimates
of effective tariffs nothing definite can be said, except that effective rates
of protection remained higher than nominal rates.
Ill
After having described the process of import liberalization an attempt
will now be made to evaluate the consequences of the policy. The conflict
of views described in the previous sections can serve as a useful framework
of analysis. To be examined are, on the one hand, the protectionists' fears
that liberalization would eliminate some Israeli producers rather than make
them more efficient and, on the other hand, the reformers' hopes that
competition would remove much of the misallocation which the import
substitution policies of the 1950s had introduced into the economy.
In testing the hypothesis that the import liberalization programme led
to greatly increased imports of manufactured goods with damaging effect
on domestic producers, the major problem is the absence of ceteris paribus
conditions. In particular, the years 1965-7.saw the slowest GNP growth
rates in Israel's history as a planned deflation (to reduce the trade deficit)
was turned into a recession by a series of unanticipated factors. Thus,
if we look at Israel's commodity imports, we find no break in their rate
of growth in 1962, but a rapid increase in this rate occurs after 1967; e. g.,
the value of commodity imports only increased by 50 % 1960-7 but by 264 %
1967-1972. These results confirm our categorization of the period up to
1967 as one of replacing quotas by tariffs without reducing the level of- 50 -
protection and of the period starting in 1968 as one of substantial tariff
reductions. They also, however, reflect that 1965-7 were slow growth
years (imports actually fell in 1967) and that since the late 1960s the dollar
has been declining in value. It is therefore rather difficult to separate the
effects of tariff policy from these other influences on import performance.
The value of manufactured imports is of greater interest than that of
total inputs in evaluating the liberalization programme, since the incidence
of this programme fell on the manufacturing sector. The same pattern of a
significant increase in the rate of import grov/th after 1967 is revealed here.
It should be pointed out that the most rapid growth rate for a single year is
in 1967-8, which is before the tariff cuts could have had any significant effects
and clearly reveals the major recovery elements released after the recession
had come to an end . Further support for the preponderent influence of the
level of domestic economic activity (y) in determining the level of manufactured
37 imports (m) is obtained from regressing the two variables . For 1960-72 the
relationship is positive and strongly significant, although serial correlation
is great too: -
(1) m = 53.088 + 0.052 y R
2 = 0.955
(49.737) (0.003) d =0.88
This is in itself unsurprising, but it is interesting to note that division
The same observation applies to total commodity imports.
Data for m are taken from Table X row 6 (manufactured imports are
defined as S. I. T. C. groups 5-8) and for y Israeli GNP in I£m. is used.
It should be noted that the purpose of this exercise is not to use the
estimated coefficients, which would be a debatable procedure in view
of the expected high serial correlation, but to look for any major
diversions from the regression line in order to gain an impression as
to whether they are associated with the domestic business cycle or
with government policy.- 51 -
of the period into two subperiods (1960-7 and 1968-72) or addition of a
dummy variable (k = 0 if t * 1967 and k = 1 if t - 1968) did not improve
the results. Even more interesting is the fact that the greatest divergence
between actual and estimated (using m from (1) ) values of m occurred in
the years 1966 and 1967, which suggests that the largest deviations from
the linear relationship occurred in response to domestic cyclical fluctuations
rather than in response to tariff changes.
Before leaving the aggregate data on manufactured imports a final
comparison can be made. Domestic industrial output rose from I£ 845m. in
on
1960 to I£ 2, 865m. in 1968 and I£ 5, 932m. in 1972. . Even allowing for
differences in coverage and the decline in value of the Israeli pound against
the dollar the rate of growth of domestic output of manufactured goods appears
to exceed the rate of growth of imports of these goods: This suggests that
the ratio of imports to domestic supplies has decreased even after the explicit
39 pursuit of import substitution had been abandoned . This issue will not be
followed up here because the extent of import substitution, if it occurred, was
small and because there is no government policy of encouraging import
substitution to be evaluated in the 1962-72 period. The fact that import
substitution appears to be positive, and not strongly negative, does, however,
cast a bad light on the policy of the 1950s when substantial protection was
offered domestic producers and yet the amount of actual substitution was only
small then too.
38
Statistical Abstract of Israel 197 3, p. 169. These figures represent
the contribution of mining and manufacturing to NDP at factor cost.
This does not, of course, mean that import substitution had to be
positive in all sectors. In fact, it could even be negative in all sectors
and there still be positive import substitution at the aggregate level, if
Chenery-type measures are being used (cf. Desai). The aggregate
figure, however, does at least suggest that negative import substitution
did not occur on a large scale.- 52 -
Although the post 1968 tariff reductions were not themselves responsible
for a flood of manufactured imports, they did have some effect on such
imports* Manufactured imports as a proportion of total commodity imports
increased substantially after 1967 (Table X). This may partly reflect increased
demand for manufactured goods as the development process moves on, but
the suddenness of the increase suggests that an exogenous shock such as the
tariff reductions may be the appropriate explanation.
In addition to affecting the composition of imports between manufacturing
and other broad groups we would also expect the liberalization programme
to alter the composition of manufactured imports. In particular, we would
expect imports of goods receiving the largest reductions in effective tariffs
40 to exhibit the fastest growth rates once the tariff cuts had begun . The data
necessary for examining this hypothesis are given in Table XI. The commodity
groups are ranked according to their 1967 effective tariff rates and their rate
41 of import growth 1968-72 . The expectation is that goods ranking highly on
40
Ideally, of course,we would like to compare actual 1972 import levels
with what they would have been in 1972 had the liberalization programme
not been implemented rather than with their 1968 levels, but this is a
., much more difficult exercise. 41
The 1967 effective tariff rate is used as a proxy for the size of the
reduction in effective tariffs because no effective tariff data are available
for later years (cf. section II). If the government policy of reducing the
dispersion of rates was applied evenly this would be a perfect proxy, but
governments' declared policies do not always work out as intended. An
alternative proxy would be the changes in the nominal tariffs given in
Table IX. A ranking according to the absolute or percentage change in
nominal tariff rates would differ little from that in column 2 of Table XI;
the major variations would be a lower ranking for textiles and clothing
and for non-metallic mineral products, while other commodity groups'
rankings were marginally improved. The ranking according to 1967 effective
tariff rate is retained because effective tariff rates are economically more
significant than nominal rates and because the analysis in section II
supported the assumption that the governments' declared policy of
reducing the dispersion as well as the height of tariff rates was realized.Table X
Commodity Imports into Israel 1960-72 (U.S.$m.)
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Sources: Statistical Abstract of Israel, various years.- 54 -
one count should do so on the other too, but this is not borne out. The
Spearman rank correlation coefficient (p) was 0.228, which indicates
a positive relationship between the two rankings, but a very weak one.
The clearest contradictory result is for clothing, which had the highest
effective protection rate in 1967, but during the reduction and equalisation
of tariffs up to 1972 clothing imports grew more slowly than other groups'
42
imports . There may be some problems of aggregation, e.g., imports
of those clothing items with previously high tariffs may have grown rapidly
but been offset in the aggregate figure by slow-growing items, but this
would appear insufficient to explain the low p value. Thus, we are left
with the conclusion that reducing the level and dispersion of tariff rates
did not significantly increase imports of previously heavily protected
goods. A corollary to this is that many of the high effective tariffs up to
1967 were unnecessary for protection purposes because the imports were
not price elastic in the relevant range.
If the worst fears of the anti-liberalization faction were to be realized,
w would expect to find that domestic production of goods with high effective
tariffs in 1967 would increase slowly, if at all, after that date. This
hypothesis can be tested with the data from Table XI. The correlation
between a ranking according to 1967 effective tariff rate and growth in
industrial production for 1968-72 was p = 0.780. This coefficient is of
the opposite sign to that predicted by the hypothesis and is, furthermore,
43 large . Reservations must again be made concerning the aggregation
42
The particular proxy used for the size of tariff reduction may overstate
the magnitude in the case of clothing (cf. previous footnote). If industries
were ranked in Table XI by at solute reduction in nominal tariff clothing
and textiles would be third, an if ranked by percentage reduction in
nominal tariffs they woul be seventh. It should be noted that if either
of these alternative rankings were used the value of p would be higher,
although the effect of the lower ranking of non-metallic mineral products
would to some extent offset the effect of the lower textile and clothing
43 ranking.
It is significant at the 1 % level.- 55 -
Table XI
Effective Tariff Rate in 1967 and the Rate of Growth of Imports,
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1972 than in 1968, but this reflects the exceptionally high value for
1967 and $ 1.9m. in 1969). If 1969 had been taken as the base year,
at 52 % would have been among the lowest growth rates.
Sources: effective tariffs are from Tov, p. 33; import growth rates are calculated from data in Statistical
Abstract of Israel 1973, pp. 202-5, and 1969, pp. 202-5; indices of industrial production from
Statistical Abstract of Israel 1973, pp. 438-9.- 56 -
level, but the conclusion is rather clear-cut; reduction in tariffs not
only didn't hurt domestic production, but even appears to have been
beneficial.
The last result clearly refutes the argument that liberalization would
eliminate domestic production in heavily protected industries, but it is
difficult to put a solid positive interpretation on the finding. One argument
would be to relate the previously high protection to future growth by the
infant industry argument, i. e., protection enabled industries to overcome
an initial competitive disadvantage and build up their efficiency which was
just ready to be exploited when the tariffs were reduced. Such an argument
is difficult to test without detailed productivity figures at different points in
time, which are not 3/et at hand. An alternative argument would look to the
demand side and explain the growth in output by factors exogenous to the
tariff changes. In this argument the tariff changes play no causal role, but
it is then possible to explain why the liberalization programme met relatively
little opposition in the 1968-72 period. These are, at best, vague hypotheses
put forward in response to an interesting finding and will be pursued no
further at this stage.
So far we have examined whether the protectionists' fears regarding
liberalization were fulfilled; in a sense, this has been a study of the "costs"
of the policy. Turning now to the benefits side, we find that it is even more
44
difficult to come to any firm conclusions with the tools at hand"". The
major airm of the liberalization programme at its inception was to improve
resource allocation at the macroeccnomic level, while later emphasis was
on improving efficiencj' at the industry level. To analyse the first of these
44
Quantitative studies of the effects of trade liberalization have con-
centrated on the static welfare effects, i. e., the benefits of shifting
to a higher utility surface. Since we are interested in the present
context in the effect of trade liberalization on future productive potential,
the static welfare approach is unhelpful (cf. Learner a. Stern, ch. 8.
for a summary of the methodology and results obtained).- 57 -
issues would require a general equilibrium model of the Israeli economy,
while the latter would require productivity studies at the industry level.
A partial answer to the question of whether liberalization improved
resource allocation could be obtained from estimates of Israel's comparative
advantage. Published estimates of domestic resource costs are available for
1958-60 (Bruno 1962). They are admittedly old for the present purpose, but
do provide a guide as to Israel's comparative advantage. The DRCs are
highest for chemicals, clothing and textiles - ail heavily protected until
1967. Tariff liberalization should have reduced distortions in the form of
above optimal production in these sectors, although the growth rates of both
imports and domestic production of these goods were not exceptionally low
1968-72. It is the author's intention to make up to date and detailed
estimates of Israel's comparative advantage, and when this has been done
firmer conclusions may be possible. At this stage all that can be said is
that liberalization probably removed the worst excesses of misallocation
under the protectionist trade regime (cf.part I cf fiic; paper), although it is
not clear to what extent resource allocation was improved* .
IV
The policy of import liberalization announced in 1962 has, albeit
slowly, come to affect a significant proportion of Israel's manufacturing
sector. The major fear regarding the effects of the liberalisation, i. e.,
the fear that a flood of imports would drive some domestic producers out
of business has been proved to be without foundation. The only cost of
45
One source of reallocation which could be expected is between markets,
i. e., the implicit disincentive to seek export markets contained in
artificially high domestic prices should have been reduced after 1968.
This was not the case before 1968 because the 1962 devaluation package
affected import prices by more than export prices and opened a gap
between the effective exchange rates on imports and on exports which
was not closed until after the 1967 war (Amiel, p. 32). Unfortunately
data on effective exchange rates for the 1970s are not yet available
and it is thus not possible to determine whether a gap has opened up
in the opposite direction.- 58 -
the policy appears to have been the relatively minor one of tying down
skilled manpower in examining the proposed tariffs on an item by item
basis. The principal benefit from the policy has been a reduction of the
misallocation of resources which prevailed under the protectionist regime,
although it is difficult to quantify the extent of this reduction. There is
also the minor benefit of greater ease of administration than under the old
scheme whereby a permit had to be issued and an exchange rate specified
for every import transaction.
The surprising finding that those goods with the heaviest protection
before liberalization tended to enjoy the most rapid growth in domestic
output 1968-72 suggests that some intra-industry benefits followed from
the policy. The further finding that import substitution was in the aggregate
positive after 1962 implies that the liberalization policy had little effect
on the pace of import substitution. The inference may be drawn from .'.the
last argument that the protectionist policy (and resulting misallocation of
resources) of the 1950s was unnecessary to obtain the small amount of im-
port substitution which actually took place in that decade. This extension
is not, however, necessarily valid, since the ceteris paribus conditions
changed. The counterargument could be made that the import substitution
behind barriers in the 1950s was a necessary precondition to bring Israeli
industry up to the efficiency levels where it could make import substitution
progress without protection in the 1960s (and could also make progress in
export markets)
46
Compare, for example, Tyler' s work on Brazil. Industrial growth rates
have been higher there during the export expansion era since the mid
1960s than they were during the import substitution era of the 1950s.
Nevertheless, Tyler suggests that the import substitution policy was
not necessarily misguided, since it may have been the only way to get
domestic industry to the level of competitiveness required to make a
success of export expansion (i. e., via economies of scale, learning
effects, etc.). A similar argument, stressing the learning effects
(especially among entrepreneurs), has been made on a more general
level by Donges.- 59 -
Import liberalization policies have often been advocated by economists,
but are opposed by the country' s decision-makers on the grounds that,
although they are theoretically attractive, they are impractical on a
unilateral basis. Government officials fear that increased imports will
intensify balance of payments problems, while entrepreneurs fear the
competition from cheaper imports. In the Israeli case, the economists
had a difficult time getting the policy accepted and then having it
implemented as intended, but after the policy had been implemented in
a significant way the fears of its opponents proved to be generally
groundless.- 60 -















































Section II. Plants and their products
Ch. 6. Live plants, bulbs, etc.
Ch. 7« Edible vegetables, roots and tubers
Ch. 8. Edible Fruits and nuts
Ch. 9. Tea, coffee, spices, etc.
Ch.10. Cereals
Ch.ll. Milling products, starches, etc.
Ch.12. Oil seeds and fruit; straw and
fodder
Ch.13. Raw vegetable material for tanning
and dyeing





















































5 %- 61 -
Section IV. Products of the food and tobacco industry
Ch.16. Preparations of meat, fish, etc.
Ch.17. Sugars and sugar confectionery
Ch.l8. Cocoa and cocoa preparations
Ch.19. Preparations of flour and pastry
products
Ch.20. Preparations of vegetable and fruit
Ch.21. Misc. edible preparations
Ch.22. Beverages, spirits and vinegar













































































Ch.32. Tanning extracts, paints, inks, etc.
Ch.33« Perfumery and cosmetic preparations
Ch.34. Cleaning, polishing preparations
Ch.35. Albuminoidal substances and glues
Ch.36. Pyrotechnic products, matches, etc.
Ch.37« Photographical and cinematographical
goods
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Section VII. Artificial resins, plastics, rubber and rubber goods
Ch.39. Artificial resins, plastics, etc.











Section VIII. Hides, skins, leather and their products
Ch.4l. Raw hides, skins and leather
Ch.42. Leather goods, etc.










































Section X. Paper and products
Ch.47. Paper-making material
Ch.48. Paper, paperboard and products
there of





































Vegetable textile materials nes.
Pile, chenille, net lace fabrics,
etc.
Wadding, rope and textiles for indus-
try-
Knitted or crocheted goods
Apparel and clothing accessories
of textiles
Made-up textile articles nes.






























































































Section XIII. Non-metallic minerals and products (non-precious)
Ch.68. Stone, plaster and cement
Ch.69- Ceramic products












































Section XV. Base metals and products
Ch.73' Iron, steel and products
Ch.74. Copper and products
Ch.75« Nickel and products
Ch.76. Aluminium and products
Ch.77. Magnesium, beryllium and products
Ch.78. Lead and products
Ch.79. Zinc and products
Ch.8O. Tin and products
Ch.8l. Base metals and products nes.
Ch.82. Tools, spoons, forks of base metals






































Section XVI. Machinery and electrical goods
Ch.84. Boilers, mechanical appliances
and parts

























Railway locomotive equipment, etc.
Vehicles net for railway, and parts
Aircraft, equipment, and parts
























Section XVIII. Optical, scientific etc. apparatus
Ch.9O. Photographic and medical instruments 34,133
Ch.91. Clocks, watches and parts thereof 3,153
Ch.92. Musical instruments and sound 4,585
recorders











Section XX. Miscellaneous goods
Ch.94. Furniture
Ch.95- Carving, moulding materials and
goods
Ch.96. Brooms, brushes, etc.
Ch.97> Toys, games, sporting goods

































Note: col. (1) = value of imports in 1971 (g 000), col. (2) =
value of tariffs due on these imports at the rates existing on 31st
December 1971 {$ 000), col. (3) = (2) f (1).
Method and sources: Data on import values and quantities (in the case
of goods with specific tariffs) were taken from Israel Central Bureau
of Statistics: Foreign Trade Statistics Quarterly IV, No. 4, January-
December 1972. The import data were multiplied by the tariff rate on
each item, as given in Bundesstelle fur AuRenhandelsinformation •.
Deutsches Handels-archiv, 1972, 1. Januarheft, pp. 1-235. The resulting
import and tariff values were aggregated by BTN chapter and the former
was divided by the latter to give the average nominal tariff for each
chapter. For criticism of the weighting system (i.e., value of current
imports) see text, section II.- 66 -
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